UNEQUAL OPPORTUNITY: LATINOS AND LOCAL POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN WASHINGTON STATE

Zachary Duffy
Politics 318
Whitman College
December 11, 2009
Many of the issues of civil rights are very complex and most difficult. But about this there can and should be no argument: every American citizen must have an equal right to vote. There is no reason which can excuse the denial of that right. There is no duty which weighs more heavily on us than the duty we have to insure that right.


I. INTRODUCTION

This report examines the level of Latino local political representation in ten counties of Washington State: Adams, Benton, Chelan, Douglas, Franklin, Grant, Okanogan, Skagit, Walla Walla, and Yakima. In particular, it is meant to build on previous research in Washington that found that Latinos were underrepresented on school boards and city councils in Sunnyside, Wapato, Toppenish, Granger, and Pasco (Warner 2006; Dollar 2008; Shadix 2008). Is such underrepresentation of Latinos widespread across the state in local offices, or is it simply a product of particular circumstances within those communities? If Latinos are not being equitably represented, then what factors are contributing to that underrepresentation? Specifically, what kinds of electoral systems exist in these jurisdictions, under what statutes are these systems determined, and how might demographic characteristics interact with electoral rules to generate underrepresentation? Finally, what processes exist by which local officials can begin to empower Latino voters and candidates? The answers to these questions are gleaned from three analyses: one establishing the level of Latino representation in each county through a surname-analysis of Washington State’s office-holders, another examining the legal statutes governing the electoral methods of each jurisdiction, and a final analysis investigating the effect of sociodemographic factors on local political participation.

I find that Latinos are dramatically underrepresented in local offices and that this underrepresentation is likely a product of a confluence of structural and demographic factors that conspire to reduce both the turnout of Latino voters and the value of their votes – a perfect storm that has not even shown up on the radar before. Numerous studies (Polinard et al. 1994, Leal et al. 2004, Meier et al. 2005) have demonstrated that local-level elected officials play key roles in determining everything from the average salaries of city employees to the educational prospects of local students. As such, the potential costs to Latinos in Washington State when they lack adequate representation in many local offices are likely to be severe. Likewise, the potential benefits garnered by the presence of Latino representatives in local offices are likely to be transformative.

At surface level this report examines the political representation of Latinos in Washington State, but below the surface it is also an examination of America’s commitment to representative democracy itself. Indeed, as public figures continue to invoke the words of Abraham Lincoln in describing the particular character of our democracy – namely, that it is a government “of the people, by the people, and for the people” - the issue of who represents whom here in Washington State provides a useful test for the substance of those claims. If American government is based on the notions of
freedom, justice and equality, then we all bear a special burden to make sure that those values are put into practice.

My heartfelt thanks to Joaquin Avila, Naomi Strand, Paul Apostolidis, Enrica Maffucci, Pedro Galvao, Kathy Fisher at the Yakima County Auditor’s Office, Karen Martin, Tracy Buckles, and Barbara Clark for their assistance and advice at crucial stages as I was producing this report.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

The Right to Vote and the Voting Rights Act

The right to vote is the heart of American democracy. It is both a vital expression of our political desires and an integral part of our national consciousness. Indeed, there is perhaps nothing more integral to the American self-image than the perception of the United States as the standard for democracy and self-rule – a place where government is, as Lincoln stated in the Gettysburg Address, “of the people, by the people, and for the people.” Ensuring equal access to the franchise, then, is an obligation tied to some of America’s most deeply held political ideals.

The history of voting rights in the United States, however, has often run counter to those ideals. Women were barred from voting until 1920. Native Americans were barred by the federal government from voting until 1924, and then by states such as New Mexico until 1962. With the brief exception of the Reconstruction era, it was not until the 1960s that many African Americans could vote. By the beginning of the 20th century, various limitations on the exercise of the franchise had been instituted on the basis of gender, religion, property ownership, religion, and race. In the words of Alexander Keyssar (2000), “the list could, does, and will go on: for much of American history, the right to vote has been far from universal” (xvi).

Historically, even those minorities who were eligible to vote often found that their right to vote was a right in name only. Legislators in early twentieth century Texas, for instance, put obstacle after obstacle in the way of minorities exercising their right to vote. In an effort driven by a Texas State Representative, Alexander Terrell, the Legislature instituted a poll tax in 1902, which effectively excluded black and Latino voters by requiring all voters to pay a tax in order to vote when most black and Latino voters could not afford it. The Terrell Election Law, enacted in 1903, required that poll taxes be paid between October and February in advance of the election. “Terrell himself was explicit about the intent of the law; it would prevent opening ‘the flood gates for illegal voting as one person could buy up the Mexican and Negro votes.’ Proponents of the Terrell legislation also noted that Mexicans and blacks would either fail to pay so far in advance or lose their receipts when election time came around” (Montejano 1997, 143). At the same time, counties and towns throughout Texas instituted all-white primaries, which effectively disenfranchised minorities in a state where nomination by the Democratic Party was a de facto victory. The result of the efforts was a political system in which
literal barriers to minority voting were often directly or indirectly sanctioned by elected officials.

In the wake of this checkered past, the institution of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was a landmark move towards minority enfranchisement. The legislation’s first goal was to guarantee racial and ethnic minorities access to the vote. That meant the immediate suspension of all literacy tests, duration of residency requirements, and other formal barriers; the hiring of poll observers to ensure that voter enrollment and registration laws were followed; and the creation of “the trigger mechanism,” which required of Department of Justice approval for any changes to electoral procedures in areas with a history of discrimination. “In 1975, Congress extended the act to cover ‘language-minorities,’ including Hispanics, Native Americans, Alaskan Natives, and Asian Americans; the ‘language minority’ formulation was, in effect, a means of redefining race to include other groups who had been victims of discrimination” (Keyssar, 265). The results of these efforts were enormous: millions of Americans who had been barred from their polling places pulled the levers on voting machines for the first time.

The second goal of the Voting Rights Act and subsequent legislation was to ensure that every person’s vote had equal value. A number of Supreme Court decisions proved extremely influential in this respect. In Baker v. Carr, decided in 1962, Plaintiff Charles Baker complained that his Tennessee legislative district was much more heavily populated than other legislative districts in the state, thus making his vote for a state legislator worth less than that of a citizen of a more sparsely populated district. He argued that this was illegal under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court agreed in a 6-2 decision, setting the precedent for court intervention into electoral districting and apportionment issues. White v. Regester, decided in 1973 and consisting of four cases, was concerned with similar issues in Texas. In one of the cases, the plaintiff argued that the state legislative districts of Bexar County and Dallas conducted their elections under an electoral system that reduced the strength of the minority vote. The State House districts were ‘multimember’ districts, in which voters elect multiple representatives to serve a geographical area. Theoretically, specific constituencies within a multimember district can be prevented from electing candidates of their own choice due to the greater voting power of another constituency. While the Supreme Court had previously held that multimember districts were not inherently unconstitutional, White concluded that their use in Texas’ legislative districts diminished the value of minority votes – a concept also known as ‘vote dilution.’ White applied nationwide and decided the issue of minority vote dilution on the basis of an equal protection constitutional analysis. The White constitutional standard was later codified in Section 2 (a statute) of the Voting Rights Act in 1982, which applies nationwide. Thus “the Court expanded the notion of vote dilution beyond that developed in the reapportionment cases. [Whereas in Baker v. Carr,] an individual’s vote was diluted by virtue of unequally populated districts, [White v. Regester and later cases considered] the dilution of a group’s vote by any number of devices, including submersion” (Davidson and Grofman 1994, 32-33) in different kinds of electoral systems. Suddenly all political offices from federal senators down to public hospital district commissioners had to examine their electoral systems and
determine whether or not they were contributing to a widespread underrepresentation of minority groups.

**Success at the Polls: Electoral Systems**

In order to adequately explain the concept of vote dilution introduced by *Baker v. Carr* and *White v. Regester*, it is important to first understand how the design of electoral districts can potentially influence the power of the minority vote. Under an “at-large” electoral system, voters can vote for any of the candidates running for office in a jurisdiction. In a city council election, for instance, a voter is able to vote for each and every city council position. Some at-large electoral systems may also employ “residency districts… [which] require that a candidate run for a designated seat determined by his or residence within the jurisdiction” (Mulroy 1998, 336). Under such a system, candidates for city council positions are required to live within certain neighborhoods represented by the positions for which they are running, but voters can still elect candidates from each and every residency district within the jurisdiction. These at-large electoral systems have the potential to significantly dilute the vote of a minority group, especially in combination with a phenomenon known as ‘racedly polarized voting.’ When racial or ethnic groups consistently vote in blocs for their preferred candidates in jurisdictions employing at-large electoral systems, the minority will virtually always lose. Thus even if a voting bloc controls only 50.1% of the vote, they can elect 100% of their preferred candidates.

A basic assumption in response to this problem is that minorities are more proportionally represented when they are elected within what are known as ‘single-member districts.’ Under such an electoral system, voters can vote only for those candidates running for office within a certain geographical portion of a jurisdiction. In effect, minority groups that are highly concentrated in certain neighborhoods (otherwise known as geographically compact minorities) often become “the” majority in their single-member districts and can elect their preferred representatives, presumably resulting in a group of elected officials who more accurately reflect the political desires of their communities.

The tendencies of at-large electoral systems to depress minority representation and of single-member district electoral systems to enhance minorities’ opportunities to achieve representation on elected bodies have been borne out by a large body of scholarly literature. For instance, conducting a before-and-after analysis of all known jurisdictions in Texas changing from at-large to electoral systems in which some or all positions are elected in single-member districts, Chandler Davidson and George Korbel (1981) find that the general effect of at-large electoral systems is to provide a barrier to minority office holding. In addition, they find that single-member district elections dramatically increase minority representation. A later study of Texas municipalities by Davidson as well as Robert Brischetto, David Richards, and Bernard Grofman (1994) corroborates these findings while controlling for the impact of demographic factors and the passage of time on minority representation. Their conclusion is clear: “when [Anglo-majority] cities shift to districts, minority representation increases sharply, in contrast with cities that retain at-large elections” (252).
Scholars studying minority representation on school boards have made similar findings. In a survey of Latino representation on the school boards of districts with more than 5000 students, David L. Leal, Valerie Martinez-Ebers and Kenneth J. Meier (2004) find that “at-large elections are significantly more detrimental to Latino representation than ward elections” (1235). The study was conducted with a very significant sample size of 1,751 school districts across the United States. Theodore Arrington and Thomas Watts (1991) conduct another study of 110 school districts in North Carolina and determine that “district elections help blacks to win office proportionally to their voting strength when compared to at-large systems” (1105). In another finding of particular interest for this study, Arrington and Watts find that for school boards employing at-large systems with residency districts, “minorities have all the disadvantages of at-large elections plus the inability to cast single-shot or bullet votes for their own racial or ethnic group” (1103), causing even greater minority underrepresentation.

Given Arrington and Watts’ finding that residency districts have the potential to dilute the strength of the minority vote, it is useful to examine the potential impacts of other variations to at-large and single-member district electoral systems. Some cities, seeking to lessen the impact of at-large electoral systems, have adopted what can be termed “mixed” systems in which some positions are elected within single-member districts and others are elected at-large. Robert R. Bezdek, David M. Billeaux and Juan Carlos Huerta (2000) explain that such systems are “viewed as a way for both specific and citywide interests to be represented, combining the positive aspects of both at-large and district-based systems. In addition, mixed systems [theoretically] provide a latter for political development as minority candidates [can] move up to citywide at-large seats” (213). There are some grounds for enthusiasm for mixed electoral systems because early scholarly literature indicates that they help minority populations achieve proportional representation. For example, in a survey of the electoral systems and ethnic compositions of 243 larger “central” cities across the United States, Susan MacManus (1978) finds that Hispanic representation is most equitable in mixed systems, although the differences between at-large and mixed systems are not very large (157). McDonald and Engstrom (1992), however, report more recently that the impact of mixed systems lies somewhere in between that of single-member and at-large systems. Bezdek, Billeaux and Huerta (2000) report that any benefits garnered by mixed systems can mostly be attributed to their inclusion of single-member districts. Examining Latino representation in Corpus Christi, Texas, they find that even though a mixed system of five single-member districts and three at-large districts was instituted in 1983 to improve minority representation, Latino candidates had not won a single at-large position by 1995. They then conduct a longitudinal precinct-level multivariate analysis of the success of Latino candidates running for Corpus Christi’s at-large positions. They conclude that while “an important justification for the at-large seats in a mixed system is that the winners will have to build citywide support and thus represent the entire city…voting in the at-large elections remains [racially] polarized. Viable Latino candidates are not receiving citywide support” (223). Thus mixed-systems can still encounter the problems with racial polarization in at-large systems pointed out by Davidson and Korbel.
Several other variations to at-large systems have proven more effective in encouraging the proportional representation of minority groups. Under ‘limited voting’ rules, voters are limited to fewer votes than the number of seats up for election. Used in at-large districts with multiple candidates running for the same positions, limited voting can help to “prevent the majority from ‘making a clean sweep of all seats by voting a straight ticket’” (Mulroy 1998, 339) while avoiding the potentially thorny process of creating single-member districts. Similarly, in a ‘cumulative voting’ system, voters may cast as many votes as there are seats up for election, with the option of casting all of those votes for any number of candidates. As such, cohesive minority groups are more able to elect their preferred candidates by concentrating all of their voting power on several races (Mulroy 1998, 340). Lastly, in a ‘preference voting’ system, voters rank their preferred candidates, thus avoiding the potential pitfall of “wasted votes” (Mulroy 1998, 342) in one-vote systems, within which voters may cast their votes for candidates who have already accumulated enough votes to win election. Based on a phone survey of all identifiable communities in the United States utilizing limited voting and cumulative systems, David Brockington, Todd Donovan, Shaun Bowler, and Robert Brischetto (1998) determine that such systems produce descriptive representation of minority groups that is equal to or more proportional than single-member district systems.

Any electoral systems that help to diminish the impact of racially polarized bloc voting are likely to be especially important for Latinos. Matt E. Barreto (2007) demonstrates this importance in an analysis of mayoral elections in Los Angeles, Houston, New York, San Francisco, and Denver, in which Latino candidates ran against non-Latino candidates. In order to determine the prevalence of racially polarized voting, Barreto divides the number of registered Latino voters by the total number of registered voters and then examines the Latino turnout percentages in each precinct alongside votes for the Latino candidate (-heavy Latino turnout together with high percentage of votes going to the Latino candidate in precincts are indicators of racially polarized voting). “Across all five elections, two trends are observable,” Barreto concludes. “First, heavily Latino precincts tend to cluster together, exhibiting very similar patterns for candidate preference, and second, heavily Latino precincts display high rates of support for the Latino candidate, with few exceptions…so too do heavily Black and heavily White precincts” (431). In addition, Barreto writes that Latino “voter preferences may be directly influenced by ethnicity” (439) rather than, for instance, a candidate’s political party or ideology. The logical conclusion from Barreto’s findings is that in segregated areas, voters generally should be expected to vote for their co-ethnic candidates.

Compounding this problem is that the presence of racially polarized voting has also been found to be of particular concern in local elections. Using exit polls in fifteen lightly populated cities and school districts in Texas (between 1,000 and 15,000 voters), Robert R. Brischetto and Richard L. Engstrom (1997) investigate the extent to which voters divide along ethnic lines in elections. They find “that, had only the votes of Latinos been counted, seventeen of the nineteen Latino candidates would have been elected: two in three of the jurisdictions and one in each of the eleven others. In only one of the fifteen jurisdictions did Latino voters not support the election of a Latino candidate. In contrast, had only the votes of non-Latinos been counted, only two Latino candidates would have
been elected” (982). Bullock and Campbell (1984) conduct a survey to determine the effects of race in the 1981 Atlanta mayoral race, which was racially polarized but lacked any specific racial appeals by the candidates. They discover that three-fourths of Atlanta’s electorate votes “for a candidate of their own race because they have no particular reason to do otherwise” (162) in an election lacking powerful partisan cues or an important ballot measure.

In recent years, some scholars have questioned whether single-member district systems are the most effective way to remedy vote dilution and counter racially polarized voting. In her survey of the electoral systems and ethnic compositions of 243 larger “central” cities across the United States, Susan MacManus (1978) finds that while single-member districts do result in increased minority representation, the gain is only slight, and previous scholarly literature has overstated the impact of electoral structure on minority representation. Susan Welch (1990) responds to these concerns by conducting a similar survey in 314 U.S. cities with populations over 50,000, at least 5% of that population being Hispanic. Welch controls for the potential effects of region, city demographics, political culture, and other contextual variables that might have some impact on Latino representation. Welch also conducts a bivariate statistical regression in order to determine exactly how different electoral structures affect the relationship between minority representation and the total minority population. She finds that “blacks are still most equitably represented by district elections, at least up to the point where they are majorities or near majorities” (1072). Welch follows this up with a finding of particular interest to this study: “These generalizations about the linkage between electoral structures and the representation of blacks do not apply to Hispanics. The ability of Hispanic populations to benefit from district elections appears to depend on their degree of residential segregation, their population proportion, and the state or region in which they are located” (1072). Welch’s conclusion that single-member districting is not particularly valuable to Latino representation has since been contradicted by a wide range of scholarly research, including that on school boards and city councils (Leal, Martinez-Ebers, and Meier 2004; Arrington and Watts 1991; Brischetto, Richards, and Grofman 1994). Still, Welch’s point about other factors affecting a minority group’s ability to elect a representative has merit. The literature introduced so far has only dealt with how electoral structure can affect minority representation. Yet certainly there are factors beyond electoral systems that help to determine whether or not a minority candidate is elected.

Success at the Polls: Contextual and Demographic Factors

It is unlikely that the interactions between electoral systems and voters exist within a vacuum, so it is important to identify what resources minority groups must have at their disposal in order to succeed at the polls. Within single-member district electoral systems, one of the most important of these is a group’s “geographical compactness” or “residential segregation. The more concentrated a minority population is within a city, the better able that population is to elect a candidate of their choice under a ward or districted system. Conversely, the more diffuse a minority population is, the more difficult it would be to draw ‘safe’ minority districts” (Polinard, Wrinkle, Longoria, and Binder 1994, 13).
Arnold Vedlitz and Charles A. Johnson (1982) investigate the significance of racial segregation in their comparison of the electoral methods of 218 cities, obtained from survey data, alongside the results from a racial segregation index (Taeuber Index). The 218 cities are defined by the U.S. Census as “Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas,” meaning that they are contiguous areas of high population density. The Taeuber Index is based on an analysis of block-level Census data for white and non-white households; if the proportion of whites and non-whites living in a neighborhood is similar to the proportion of each group living in a city as a whole, then the neighborhood is not segregated. Vedlitz and Johnson find that “in nonsegregated environments, single-member districts make no improvement over at-large ones in equality of minority representation, while in the segregated cities black representation in single-member district communities was nearly three times more favorable than in at-large communities” (734). Thus single-member districting is most effective in the most segregated areas.

Of course, it doesn’t matter if a city changes from at-large to single-member district elections or has a high degree of residential segregation if minority voters do not turn out to vote on Election Day. This is of particular concern in Washington State, where Latinos are significantly less likely to vote than non-Latino voters. According to a report by the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials (2006), only 40.3% of Latino voters went to the polls in Washington’s 2006 General Elections, in comparison to a turnout of 59.6% of non-Latino voters. Given that 72.8% of all voters who are eligible to vote are registered, in comparison to a registration-level of 48% of eligible Latinos, the disparities in political participation between the two groups are even wider than turnout levels indicate.

If Latinos are registering and turning out to vote at such low rates, it is important to determine the factors that might influence their political participation. Using data from the 1999 Washington Post Survey of Latinos in America, John A. Garcia and Gabriel Sanchez (2004) construct two political participation indices – the first being the likelihood of regular voting and the second being the summated range of Latino political activities – and then conduct a multivariate analysis to determine which socioeconomic, ethnic-related, and psychological factors have effects on the indices. The results indicate that political participation is affected by factors from all three categories of variables. In the socioeconomic cluster of variables, Latinos who are more educated and older are found to be more likely to regularly vote and to be politically involved. Four ethnic-related variables have a positive effect on the likelihood of regular voting and political involvement: English-language use, English-language proficiency, the perception that Latinos have common political interests, and nativity. Lastly, Latinos who perceive regular discrimination and who are encouraged to participate are more likely to be politically involved. Overall, Garcia and Sanchez’ results highlight the fact that Latino political participation is partially determined by an individual’s resources and how and whether that person is contacted and encouraged to participate.

In fact, socioeconomic and cultural factors seem to play a very significant role in depressing political participation. Robert A. Jackson (2003) conducts a multivariate analysis of how sociodemographic factors such as race, income, age, education,
residential stability, marital status, and immigrant status affect the registration status and turnout of Latino citizens. The study’s sample size is extremely large because Jackson relies on data from the Voter Supplement File of the U.S. Census November 2000 Current Population Survey. His finding is revealing: “controlling for socio-demographic factors basically eliminates the gap in participation between Hispanic Americans and Anglos” (359). Apart from the possibility of discrimination, there is no hidden factor that causes Latinos to stay away from the polls. Their voter turnout and registration is lower because they are, on average, on the wrong side of the socio-economic, ethnic, and psychological factors identified by Garcia and Sanchez.

If Latino political participation is often lower than non-Latino political participation because of these demographic factors, the usefulness of electoral system reform becomes even clearer. Susan Welch and Timothy Bledsoe (1988) examine the relationship between the socioeconomic status of elected minority candidates and the electoral structures under which they serve. They analyze data from a nationwide mail survey sent to 1600 council members in cities between 50,000 and one million population; all of the cities fitting these population criteria with district and mixed election systems are included along with a random sample of two-thirds of the cities using at-large systems. Welch and Bledsoe find that “district elections provide a greater opportunity for people of lower income and education to be elected [than in at-large elections]” (50). Single-member districts ensure greater heterogeneity in residents’ income and ethnicity, to pick a few sociodemographic factors, thereby improving the chances of candidates that most likely would have lost out in at-large elections.

**Why Latino Representation Matters**

Left unexplained in the discussion so far is the question of why state and local governments should go through so much trouble and put so much thought into helping Latinos elect representatives of their own ethnicity. In order to answer this question, it is useful to first define two different forms of representation: descriptive and substantive. Kim Geron (2005) explains that “descriptive representation for people of color matches the race, ethnicity, or national origin of the representative and his or her constituents...the highest form of representation is substantive representation, where a representative acts in the interests of the represented, in a manner responsive to them” (11). The main component of substantive representation – whether or not an official has his or her constituents’ interests in mind – is also termed ‘policy responsiveness.’ Descriptive representation is likely to be important to Latinos because Latino representatives serve as role models and examples of what might be for their co-ethnic constituents. In and of itself, however, this is not enough: Latinos need someone to represent their interests and not just their color.

It is of great interest, then, that many scholars have found that Latino representatives are most effective at representing the interests of the Latino community. J.L. Polinard, Robert D. Wrinkle, Tomas Longoria, and Norman E. Binder (1994) conduct a study of the policy responsiveness of Mexican-American representatives on Texas school boards and city councils using two methods. The first is an aggregate data analysis of city
records, litigation files, survey data obtained from Texas cities with populations above 2,000 regarding the electoral structures, size of city councils, and ethnic composition of their councils, a one-out-of-four randomly drawn sample of cities between 2,500 and 20,000 population, and an additional mail survey of the mayors and councilpersons of the same cities. The second is a six-year longitudinal case-study analysis of the officials of ten Texas cities disparate in region and population. They find that with the election of Mexican-American city council members, “more Mexican-Americans are hired in the hired ranks of municipal employees, ...more Mexican Americans enjoy higher pay status, ... [and] more Mexican Americans are appointed to the important municipal boards and commissions” (137). In addition, the election of Mexican American school board members “will increase the number of Mexican American school administrators and teachers. An increase in the number of Mexican American administrators and teachers, in turn, depresses the negative impact of” (163) Mexican American students being disproportionately disciplined and tracked into remedial bilingual classes with lower graduation rates. This finding is echoed by David L. Leal, Valerie Martinez-Ebers and Kenneth J. Meier (2004) in their study of 1,532 school districts across the United States, controlled for demographic factors in the labor pool that might affect the hiring of teachers and administrators. They find that “while characteristics of the available labor pool play a role in predicting the presence of Latino administrators and teachers, they are overshadowed by the importance of having Latinos at higher levels of authority. Latino representation on school boards is significantly associated with increases in the percentage of Latino administrators, and the percentage of Latinos in administration is the most important variable determining the presence of Latino teachers” (1242).

Building on this research, Kenneth J. Meier, Eric Gonzalez Juenke, Robert D. Wrinkle, and J.L. Polinard (2005) ask whether or not the electoral systems within which school board members are elected might affect the degree to which they substantively represent their constituents. The authors hypothesize that descriptive representation will translate into substantive representation but at different levels depending on the method of election. In other words, the authors theorize that blacks and Latinos elected at-large will be less constrained to represent their co-ethnic constituents than those blacks and Latinos who are elected in a ward. Examining Texas school districts in 1999 in which blacks and Latinos were numerical minorities, the authors conduct a statistical analysis of Latino and Black school board representatives and the hiring practices of the school boards they represent. They find that representatives produced under at-large systems are associated with fewer minority administrators being hired, which in turn results in fewer minority teachers being hired.

At stake in the election of Latino school board representatives are the educational prospects of thousands of Latino students. The presence of Latino teachers – which increases with the election of Latino school board members - has been shown to have a significant positive influence on the classroom experiences of Latino students. Minority students who have been taught by minority teachers graduate more often, drop out less frequently, score higher on their SATs, are tracked into honors-level classes more often, are less likely to be tracked into remedial classes, and receive more proportional disciplinary punishments (Meier and Stewart 1991; Meier, Stewart and England 1989;
Meier, Wrinkle and Polinard 1999; Meier et al 2001). If Latino school board representatives are not elected, Latinos suffer a very real blow to their children’s quality of education. Even worse, their future prospects of electoral success are significantly diminished as poorly educated citizens are likely to fall victim to many of the socioeconomic factors that depress political participation.

**The Electoral Landscape of Washington State**

Knowing what we do now about the substantial benefits of Latino political representation, it is worth looking into the political conditions of Latinos in Washington State. It is likely that Washington is home to many of the electoral systems and demographic factors that have been previously discussed, yet it may also have its own particular political character which affects Latinos in ways that have not yet been considered.

Thus far voting rights research regarding Latinos in Washington State has mainly consisted of reports examining whether municipalities are violating the Voting Rights Act. A report written by Ian Warner (2006) is particularly significant in this vein because it resulted in the city of Sunnyside, Washington voluntarily changing its electoral system from at-large to mixed in order to avoid legal action from the Department of Justice. Warner examines voter lists, demographic data, and election results from Sunnyside and then conducts a bivariate regression analysis in order to determine whether or not the outcome of elections was being influenced by racially polarized voting. He finds that “the at-large elections in Sunnyside disadvantage the Latino population [due to the presence] of racially polarized voting. [In addition,] Latinos in Sunnyside are registered to vote and partake in the act of voting at a much lower rate than non-Latinos. [Lastly,] there is a lack of social programming aimed at encouraging voter participation and education in Sunnyside” (2).

Later research has followed Warner’s example while also more fully examining the dimensions of political participation with which Washington State’s Latinos seem to struggle. Nicholas Dollar (2008) examines the level of Latino electoral participation and representation in the Yakima Valley communities of Wapato, Toppenish, and Granger. He analyzes the potential effects of local election structures on the success of minority school board candidates, examines whether or not racially polarized voting has occurred in the communities, and interviews prominent officials and residents in order to determine the political conditions of each of the jurisdictions. He finds that in two of the school districts examined, the at-large electoral system with residency districts used by the school boards “systematically reduces the influence of the Latino vote and hinders Latino candidates in competitive elections” (46). However, Dollar cautions that a change in the electoral system will not be effective if it is not accompanied by other measures: “in this case, it appears that mobilization of the Latino community must come” (51) first. Tim Shadix (2008) analyzes such mobilization efforts in his analysis of the bilingual efforts of Pasco, WA in Franklin County. While he does not provide quantitative analysis of a potential link between bilingual efforts and increased Latino voter turnout, he points to other scholarly literature on the subject and concludes that “whether or not the increase
in Franklin County’s voter turnout can be shown as a correlation [with bilingual efforts], …these programs ultimately seem to facilitate the dramatic increase of Latino political participation over the course of a few years” (24). In addition, Shadix discovers that some of Washington State’s local jurisdictions employ one kind of electoral system in the primary election and another kind in the general election: “Franklin County purports to have a mixed-system for elections, where some seats for the city council are at-large, and others are district positions. Yet these elections are only strictly district elections in the primaries. Any candidate making it past the primary in September must then go on to an at-large vote in the general election two months later” (25). Thus even ‘district’ elections in Washington State may not actually mitigate the effects of minority vote dilution in the way that pure single-member district elections would.

It appears that up to this point, research on Latino representation in Washington State has focused only on city council and school board elections. Yet these constitute only a small piece of the patchwork of county and local government, in which there are dozens of districts with officials up for election every year. Many of these are known as ‘special purpose districts,’ and there are around 1700 of them in Washington State. “By contrast, there are only 39 counties and 281 cities…Washington has the sixth highest number of special districts of all states in the country” (MRSC 2003, 14). Such districts usually exist to provide different services to communities: electricity, fire protection, flood control, irrigation, water and sewer service, economic development, and parks maintenance, to list just a few. “Special purpose districts are authorized by a labyrinth of statutes passed since statehood, and there are many variations in governmental form…Lesser known districts are nearly invisible to the public as units of government” (MRSC 2003, 7). The services they provide, however, are deeply appreciated by all every time they take a drink of clean water or go for their morning run.

There are, in total, 14 kinds of special districts which are governed by elected boards in Washington State. Equitable representation in special districts is likely to be as crucial for Latinos as it is in school boards and city councils. Nicholas Bauroth (2005) synthesizes the limited research in this field and explains that “special districts are not created to serve an abstract need but, instead, to assist a specific public constituency. For example, drainage districts have been designated in Illinois because landowners adjacent to wetlands need a stream to be dredged, and cemetery districts have been formed in Kansas because small churches want their graves maintained in perpetuity. In each instance, districts were created to serve a particular constituency – not the population at large – that lobbies for policies that further their own ends” (195). Without access to special district representation, Latinos miss out on some very tangible benefits: the maintenance of their neighborhood parks, the proper functioning of their sewers, the measures taken to prevent their basements from flooding, the quick response-time of their fire brigade.

Given the particular importance of previously unexamined special districts to Washington State and the high percentage of Latinos living in many of its counties, it is worth asking several questions about the political representation of Latinos in Washington State. Is the underrepresentation of Latinos found by Warner in Sunnyside, Dollar in Wapato, Toppenish, and Granger, and Shadix in Pasco widespread across the state in local offices,
or is it simply a product of particular circumstances within those communities? If Latinos are not being equitably represented, then what factors are contributing to that underrepresentation? Specifically, what kinds of electoral systems exist in these jurisdictions, under what statutes are these systems determined, and how might demographic characteristics interact with electoral rules to generate underrepresentation? Finally, what processes exist by which local officials can begin to empower Latino voters and candidates? At surface level this report examines the political representation of Latinos in Washington State, but as literature has shown, the issue of who represents whom has consequences that extend into nearly every aspect of our daily lives. In short, the potential costs to Latinos in Washington State when they lack adequate representation in many local offices are likely to be severe. Likewise, the potential benefits garnered by the presence of Latino representatives in local offices are likely to be transformative.

III. DISCUSSION OF PRIMARY RESEARCH METHODS

In order to begin to answer the questions above, I first sought to find out what local voting jurisdictions exist in Washington State, the ethnicities of their office-holders, and the electoral systems under which they are governed. I contacted the Washington State Secretary of State’s Office but I was told that they do not keep comprehensive records regarding the office-holders and electoral systems of Washington State’s local voting jurisdictions. Without an easy way of obtaining the records, I narrowed the scope of my project to investigating the ten counties in Washington State with the highest Latino populations by percentage according to 2000 Census information: Adams, Benton, Chelan, Douglas, Franklin, Grant, Okanogan, Skagit, Walla Walla, and Yakima. Apart from being home to large numbers of Latinos who have a stake in the political process, these counties were chosen because they are excellent case studies for the rest of the state. If Latinos have been unable to achieve equitable representation in counties where they constitute potentially influential voting blocs, then it is likely that the pattern extends statewide. I contacted the county auditors of these counties and requested the same information. Once I had obtained complete records from the ten counties, I organized the data by coding all the office-holders based on whether or not they possessed a Latino surname. The list of surnames was from the U.S. Department of Justice for use in Yakima County’s bilingual outreach efforts and provided to me by Pedro Galvao, who had previously conducted a surname analysis of voter-rolls in Walla Walla County in order to determine the prevalence of racially-polarized voting in recent elections. David L. Word and R. Colby Perkins Jr. (1996) explain that surname-analysis is accurate and effective in determining Hispanic ethnicity:

> With very few exceptions every frequently occurring surname is either Heavily Hispanic or Rarely Hispanic and there is no middle ground. This finding is the determining factor why Spanish surname is such an excellent proxy for identifying Hispanics within the United States…Fewer than 1,000 surnames are sufficient for capturing 80 percent of the Hispanic population in the United States. Moreover, householders with those surnames are Hispanic 95 percent of the time.

(16)

Given that the Department of Justice list contains nearly 13,000 surnames and that this method is used in official racially polarized voting analyses, I have complete confidence
that the numbers contained in this report present an accurate picture. I contacted the county auditors after this process and based on their feedback re-coded office-holders who had been falsely identified as Latino. I also coded the electoral systems based on criteria determined by myself and my community partner Professor Joaquin Avila in consultation with scholarly literature. Jurisdictions which conducted their elections using a single-member district system in both the primary and general elections were coded as ‘district-based.’ Jurisdictions which conducted their elections using a single-member district system in the primary but an at-large system in the general election were coded as ‘mixed.’ Finally, jurisdictions which conducted their elections using an at-large system in both the primary and general elections were coded as ‘at-large.’ In addition, it is important to note that every position within every jurisdiction was coded under this system, so as to account for predicted variations within ‘mixed’ electoral systems as noted in the scholarly literature (in which some positions are elected at-large and some positions are elected using single-member districting). Vacant positions were included in these calculations.

Finding that the electoral systems governing the elections of certain local jurisdictions varied by county, I conducted an analysis of public law in order to determine the statutes in the Revised Code of Washington governing the electoral systems used in each of the local jurisdictions present within the ten counties, as determined by the auditors’ responses. In particular, I sought to find out the electoral systems under which each jurisdiction was governed and how the statutes might potentially allow for those electoral systems to be changed (e.g. switched from at-large to single-member district systems). Having tracked down the respective statutes, I interpreted the meaning of each in consultation with Naomi Strand, a student at Seattle University Law School who specializes in voting rights and works closely with Professor Avila.

Keeping in mind that Latino political participation is influenced as much by contextual and demographic factors as it is by electoral systems, I also conducted a GIS analysis. GIS stands for geographic information system, and in the program I used (ArcGIS), one can overlay several ‘layers’ of spatial information to see how they interact with one another. A GIS analysis, then, presented me with the opportunity to see on a map how demographic and contextual factors might interact with the electoral systems of local jurisdictions. I contacted the ten counties and requested to speak to the officials in charge of their GIS services. Of the ten counties, four had GIS information that was either free or affordable within the scope of this project: Douglas County, Franklin County, Skagit County, and Yakima County. I imported this GIS data using ArcGIS and compared it to block-group level data on total Hispanic population, age, income, English language use, English language proficiency, and nativity, and level of education obtained from the 2000 Census Summary File 3.

**IV. PRIMARY RESEARCH FINDINGS**

To recap the organizational method of my primary research findings, I will:
• Present evidence from elected officials lists provided by county auditors’ offices regarding the extent of Latino political representation in the ten counties examined.

• Discuss how elected officials are elected within these counties and jurisdictions and dissect the previously presented data on political representation to find out exactly how well represented Latinos are in each of the types of jurisdictions, placing these findings within the context of the electoral methods previously discussed in the literature review.

• Examine available GIS data along with Census demographic information to determine specific contextual reasons for Latino underrepresentation and to identify jurisdictions that could potentially benefit from changes to their electoral system.

**Washington State: Counties with Latino Populations above Ten Percent**


Washington State, with a 9% Latino population as of 2000, is home to the 13th highest population of Latinos in the United States (Pew Hispanic Center 2007). Much of this population, however, is concentrated in the counties of central and eastern Washington. According to the 2000 Census, ten of those counties have Latino populations of over 10%: Adams, Benton, Chelan, Douglas, Franklin, Grant, Okanogan, Skagit, Walla Walla, and Yakima.

Despite making up well over 10% of many of those counties, Latinos have not seen their numbers translate into success at the polls. As Table 1 shows, Latinos are dramatically
underrepresented in Washington State’s local offices. Local offices in this analysis are not limited to well-known positions on city councils and school boards but also include special purpose districts, which, as mentioned in the literature review, are numerous in Washington State and provide tangible social and economic benefits to residents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Number of Offices in 10 Counties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 lists the total number of Latino office-holders and their percent makeup of office-holders by county.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franklin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yakima</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Douglas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chelan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walla Walla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okanogan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skagit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is clear from Table 2 that the pattern of Latino underrepresentation is not exclusive to any county. In Yakima, the county with the most proportional Latino representation, Latinos make up 16.0% of office-holders - no small miracle given that the ten-county average is that Latinos make up 4.1% of office-holders. Still, that percentage falls far short of the 41.4% Latino population in Yakima as of 2008 (U.S. Census Bureau 2008).

In fact, the relatively high number of office-holders in Yakima obscures what is an almost complete lack of representation in the other counties. Yakima is home to more than ½ of the Latino office-holders but only 13.2% of the total offices. In a Table 1 that excludes Yakima, the percentage of Latino office-holders drops from 4.1% to 2.3%. This means that for the other nine counties, Latino representation is much rarer.

An inevitable question arises in examining these numbers, however: how many of the Latinos included in the 2008 Census percentages are legal immigrants? For that matter, how many of them are citizens? After all, it is only with U.S. citizenship that residents in Washington State have the right to vote. Matt A. Barreto and Peter Perez (2007) report
that while there were 541,722 Latino residents in Washington State in 2005, only 198,064 were voting-age citizens (2). If representation should only reflect citizenship, as many people argue, then the gap between Latino representation and their population in Washington narrows significantly.

It would be wrong, however, to examine the political representation of any minority group only in consideration of their legal citizenship. After all, local office-holders provide the most basic of services to the residents of their communities: clean water, working sewer systems, and flood protection, to give three examples. Such services are not just benefits earned from citizenship but fundamental human rights. In addition, it is important to consider that the Latino population in Washington State is disproportionately young – the Pew Hispanic Center (2007) reports that the average age of native-born Latinos in Washington State is 14 and that the average age of all Latinos in Washington State is 24. Given that so many Latinos are school-age but ineligible to vote, it is vital that they (and their parents, who have their children’s interests in mind) be adequately represented on Washington State’s local school boards. After all, such representation has been shown to significantly improve the educational prospects of Latino students (Leal et al. 2004; Meier and Stewart 1991; Meier, Stewart and England 1989; Meier, Wrinkle and Polinard 1999; Meier et al 2001). The benefits to this young constituency gained from representation on school boards alone justify the expanded measurement of political representation based on total Latino population.

Having shown that Latinos are severely underrepresented in the ten counties, it is important to examine whether or not this pattern holds in all local political offices or if there are exceptions to the rule. If such exceptions exist, then there may be certain types of services that Latinos are especially likely to receive at lower levels or in less appropriate ways than others. Table 3 lists the total number of Latino office-holders and their percent makeup of office-holders by local jurisdiction.

### Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Office</th>
<th>Total Office-Holders</th>
<th>Latino Office-Holders</th>
<th>% Latino</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City Council</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School District Director</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water-Sewer District Commissioner</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drainage / Diking / Flood Control</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Commissioner</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Park and Recreation District Commissioner</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire District Commissioner</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cemetery District Commissioner</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Commissioner</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County Officer</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judge</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County Commissioner</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Utility District Commissioner</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservation District Supervisor</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airport District Commissioner</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 3 shows, Latino office-holders are by and large city council and school board members. The two offices disproportionately account for 82.1% of Latino representation while making up only 44.5% of the total offices in the ten counties. This figure itself is somewhat misleading, as Yakima accounts for much of the success in achieving Latino representation on city councils (21 councilpeople) and school boards (15 school district directors). While any such success should be celebrated, it is important to stay attuned to the reality that there is an almost complete lack of representation in every county but Yakima, with Yakima itself only being representative of Latinos in relative terms.

Indeed, Table 3 exposes a startling and complete lack of Latino representation in many of the ten counties’ local jurisdictions. There is not a single Latino in the ten counties elected to a countywide office. There is not a single Latino in the ten counties elected to serve as a fire district commissioner and oversee the fire safety of his or her community. There are no Latinos elected to oversee their local cemeteries, protect their land and water from pollution, deliver electricity to their neighborhoods, prevent their homes from flooding, or ensure that community members have access to flights in and out of town. Out of 65 elected officials, only one Latino serves as a parks and recreation district commissioner. Out of 113 elected officials, only two serve as hospital district commissioners. All told, Latinos barely have a political voice in any of Washington’s local offices.

Given the consensus in the literature that at-large electoral systems can significantly contribute to minority underrepresentation, I tallied the number of positions elected under
at-large, mixed, and district-based electoral systems for each type of jurisdiction, as shown in Table 4.

Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type Of Office</th>
<th># At-Large Electoral Systems</th>
<th># Mixed Electoral Systems</th>
<th># District-Based Electoral Systems</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City Council</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School District Director</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water-Sewer District Commissioner</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drainage / Diking / Flood Control District Member</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital District Commissioner</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Park and Recreation District Commissioner</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire District Commissioner</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cemetery District Commissioner</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Commissioner</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County Officer</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judge</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County Commissioner</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Utility District Commissioner</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservation District Supervisor</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airport District Commissioner</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL:</strong> 1744</td>
<td><strong>TOTAL:</strong> 138</td>
<td><strong>TOTAL:</strong> 9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ninety-two percent of elections for local offices are conducted at-large, meaning that voters can vote for any of the candidates running for office in both the primary and general elections. Very few jurisdictions choose to conduct their elections under mixed...
systems – only county commissioners and port districts do so exclusively. And single-member districts are a rarity, used in less than 1% of elections in the ten counties.

The implications of these results are troubling. As discussed in the literature review, at-large electoral systems tend to depress both the level and quality of representation for minority groups. The prevalence of these systems in Washington State means that Latinos are less able to elect their preferred candidates and that when Latino candidates do gain office, they are less beholden to their co-ethnic constituents (Davidson and Korbel 1981; Meier et al. 2005). The mixed systems utilized in a minority of voting jurisdictions with district-based primaries and at-large general elections do not substantively improve the situation. Indeed, even though all county commissioners, public utility district commissioners, and port commissioners are elected under such systems, not a single Latino holds any of the three kinds of office. Lastly, the electoral systems which are known to generate more proportional representation of minority groups (district-based, limited voting, cumulative voting, and preference voting systems) have been adopted only rarely within the ten counties examined. Only 9 district-based voting systems were documented; no limited voting, cumulative voting, or preference voting systems were identified. It appears that the electoral system reforms necessary to address the severe level of Latino underrepresentation have not been enacted.

**Local Jurisdictions in Washington State: Their Electoral Systems and Statutes**

Finding that the electoral systems governing the elections of certain local jurisdictions varied by county, I conducted an analysis of public law in order to determine the statutes in the Revised Code of Washington governing the electoral systems used in each of the local jurisdictions present within the ten counties. How, for instance, are some city council positions elected at-large, others elected under mixed systems, and still others by single member districts? Likewise, how might local offices which currently conduct their elections at-large adopt an alternative system that encourages more proportional representation? The Revised Code of Washington, the record of all of Washington State’s laws, contains the statutes relevant to election law. Executive offices such as mayors, county officers, and judges were not analyzed because it can be assumed that they are always elected at-large.

I determined the electoral systems allowed under these statutes for each jurisdiction, as shown in Table 5.

**Table 5**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Office</th>
<th>At-Large</th>
<th>Mixed</th>
<th>District-Based</th>
<th>Alternative Systems</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City Council</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td><em>(Council positions elected ward-based prior to 1994; in certain kinds of cities)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>(In certain kinds of cities)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The analysis of public law presents an astonishing picture. A majority of local jurisdictions in Washington State are locked into at-large electoral systems based on their statutes, explaining the extremely high number of at-large systems and very low number of district-based systems shown in Table 4. In fact, there appear to be no avenues for instituting district-based or alternative voting systems for nearly all of Washington State’s local offices. In addition, local jurisdictions which do have some flexibility in
determining their method of election have not taken advantage of this opportunity. For example, while the Revised Code of Washington allows for fire district commissioners to be elected under at-large or mixed electoral systems, all 295 positions in the ten counties are elected at-large. In light of the substantial body of literature concerning the tendency of at-large districts to generate minority underrepresentation, these circumstances are certainly contributing to the lack of Latino office holders in the ten counties.

In addition to surveying the electoral systems for local voting jurisdictions allowed under state law, I identified the specific statutes governing each type of local office and the roles of those offices in Washington State’s government.

**City Councils**

There is no one size fits all statute that governs the election of city council members; rather, there are several statutes that are applied depending on the size of a town or city and according to the ways in which those towns and cities have organized themselves.

The standard form of city government in Washington is the mayor-council plan, in which both a mayor and a city council are elected. A popular alternative to mayor-council plans is the council-manager plan, in which councilmembers are a town’s only elected officials.

Cities under both plans may elect some or all of their councilmembers at-large or from wards. If councilmembers are elected from a ward, they are nominated in the primary election by voters living within the ward and then voted on in the general election by the voters of the entire town. Councilmembers may not be elected by ward in both the primary and general elections unless the city or town has been conducting elections in that manner since before January 1, 1994 (RCW 35.18.020; RCW 35. 22.245). I contacted the Washington State Legislature to ask about the rationale for why councilmembers are not currently permitted to be elected by ward in general elections, but the question was left unanswered.

First class cities (having populations over 10,000) can divide themselves into wards by a city council ordinance as long as their charter does not expressly prevent doing so or restrict the periods of time in which it can be done (RCW 35.22.370).

Second class cities (with populations between 1,500 and 10,000) can divide themselves into wards by a city council ordinance but cannot create more than six wards (RCW 35.23.05).

The existence of a legal provision (or prohibition) for towns (with populations below 1,500) to divide themselves into wards is not clear. Given that towns are covered under RCW 35.18.020, in which they can elect councilmembers by ward, they must be able to divide into wards if they have not already done so. Still, I was not able to identify the corresponding section in the Revised Code of Washington.

Cities and towns in Washington State can also choose to reclassify themselves as ‘noncharter code cities.’ The Optional Municipal Code in Washington State allows cities
and towns to govern themselves as they see fit, as long as their policies do not conflict with the state constitution or laws. This is the most popular form of city government in Washington State, as it gives cities and towns the freedom to continue under mayor-council or council-manager plans while extending their powers. Noncharter code cities and towns can divide themselves into an unlimited number of city council wards. However, they are still restricted from holding pure single-member-district elections unless they had been doing so prior to January 1, 1994 (MRSC 2009).

Lastly, it appears that cities with populations over 10,000 can opt to become ‘charter code cities,’ under which classification they would be able to elect councilpersons from wards in both the primary and general elections (MRSC 2009). The laws that apply to first-class and second-class cities as well as towns do not apply to charter code cities. (RCW 35A.10.010)

In summary, city councils may conduct their elections under at-large or mixed systems, and there are provisions in place to divide towns and cities into wards in which councilpersons are nominated in the primary election. However, there are very few avenues for city councilpersons to be elected under what I have categorized as district-based or alternative systems.

School District Directors

School districts in Washington State are, by default, run by officials elected at-large to serve on school boards (RCW 28A.343.010). These officials are also known as ‘school district directors.’ School district directors are responsible for guiding the policy, programs, regulations, and procedures of local schools. Previous research indicates that school boards with Latino representatives hire more Latino administrators and that schools with Latino administrators hire more Latino teachers. The presence of Latino teachers, in turn, positively affects the educational experiences of Latino students (Leal et al. 2004; Meier and Stewart 1991; Meier, Stewart and England 1989; Meier, Wrinkle and Polinard 1999; Meier et al 2001).

‘Director districts’ within school districts may be instituted in accordance with Washington State law, and in these cases they are equivalent to the residency districts discussed in the literature review. School district directors are required to live within a certain geographical area of the school district, but they are still elected at-large by the entire school district (RCW 28A.343.350). Unfortunately, similar systems have been shown to depress minority representation at rates equal to or greater than pure at-large districts (Arrington and Watts, 2001). Thus dividing school districts into these residency districts is likely to be of little help to Latinos.

I could find no legal avenues for instituting mixed, district-based, or alternative elections of school district directors.

Water-Sewer District Commissioners
Water-sewer districts in Washington State oversee the water and sewer systems of many of Washington’s communities. Overseen by elected officials otherwise known as ‘water-sewer commissioners,’ each water-sewer district ensures that water supplies are clean and potable, that water and sewer service is reliable, and that water resources are responsibly managed. The responsibilities of these districts may also be overseen by separate water and sewer districts governed under the same statutes, depending on the preference of each community.

Water-sewer commissioners are, by default, elected at-large (RCW 57.12.030). By majority vote of the commissioners, water-sewer districts can also adopt mixed electoral systems in which commissioners are nominated by primary within their commissioner districts and elected at-large in the general election (RCW 57.12.039). As shown in Table 4, however, every water-sewer district in the ten counties remains under an at-large system.

I could find no legal avenues for instituting district-based or alternative elections of water-sewer district commissioners.

Special District Members (Drainage / Diking / Flood Control Districts)

Certain local jurisdictions in Washington State which help to protect land and property from damage are known as ‘special districts.’ According to the Revised Code of Washington, such districts include those that perform diking, drainage, and flood control services. Members of the governing bodies of these special districts are elected at-large in a general election. No primary elections are held (RCW 85.38.070).

In order to vote in a special district election, one has to be a ‘qualified voter.’ Qualified voters are defined as individuals, corporations, or partnerships that own land within a special district (RCW 85.38.105). This designation can result in significantly more than one vote per person. While each landowner is by default entitled to two votes, major landowners in flood control, diking improvement, or drainage improvement districts may cast up to forty votes (RCW 85.08.025; RCW 86.09.377).

The unique character of Washington’s special district elections is of particular concern to Latinos, many of whom do not meet the requirements for designation as qualified voters. According to the Pew Hispanic Center (2007), only forty-eight percent of Latinos own homes in Washington, compared to 70% of non-Hispanic whites. This relative disparity in voting power is widened by the fact that Latinos earn significantly less in annual income than non-Latino whites (Pew Hispanic Center 2007) and are therefore less likely to be major landowners in a special district. Largely ineligible to vote and with socioeconomic realities working against them, Latinos appear relegated to permanent underrepresentation on special districts without reform.

I could find no legal avenues for instituting mixed, district-based, or alternative elections of special district members.
Hospital District Commissioners

Public hospital districts oversee the operation of public hospitals in Washington as well as the delivery of other health services as needed by Washington residents. The commissioners of these districts are elected under an at-large electoral system.

When a public hospital district is first formed, the commissioners of the county within which it is located can resolve to create residency districts for the election of public hospital district commissioners (RCW 70.44.040). I did not keep comprehensive records as to the extent of residency districts in Washington State, so their use in the hospital districts of the ten counties examined is unclear. However, literature suggests that similar systems depress minority representation at rates equal to or greater than pure at-large districts (Arrington and Watts, 2001) and are therefore unlikely to be beneficial to Latinos.

I could find no legal avenues for instituting mixed, district-based, or alternative elections of hospital district commissioners.

Park and Recreation District Commissioners

Park and recreation districts in Washington State are responsible for maintaining the grounds of public parks and providing recreational and cultural opportunities to park visitors. Each district is governed by a board of five commissioners.

There is no primary to nominate candidates. While candidates must run for specific positions in the general election, they may live anywhere within the district because there are no specific commissioner districts (RCW 36.69.090).

I could find no legal avenues for instituting mixed, district-based, or alternative elections of park and recreation district commissioners.

Fire District Commissioners

Fire districts provide fire and emergency medical response services to the residents within their boundaries. In addition, most fire districts educate community members about fire safety and prevention. Each fire district is governed by commissioners who are, by default, elected at-large throughout the district.

By unanimous vote, fire district commissioners can submit a proposition to divide the district into commissioner districts to the voters of the fire district. If the measure is approved by a majority vote, the fire district adopts a mixed electoral system in which commissioners are nominated by primary within their commissioner districts and elected at-large in the general election (RCW 52.14.013). However, as shown in Table 4, this option has not been exercised a single time within the ten counties.
I could find no legal avenues for instituting district-based or alternative elections of fire district commissioners.

**Cemetery District Commissioners**

Cemetery districts are created to administer cemeteries in Washington State. Each cemetery district is governed by three commissioners who have the power to hire employees, enter into contracts, and do whatever is necessary to ensure continued operation and maintenance of the cemeteries under their jurisdiction.

Cemetery district commissioners are elected for specific commissioner positions within a general election. The commissioner positions are not based on geographic sub-districts, so they are at-large. No primaries are held (RCW 68.52.220).

I could find no legal avenues for instituting mixed, district-based, or alternative elections of cemetery district commissioners.

**Port District Commissioners**

Port districts exist primarily to encourage the economic development of communities in Washington State. While the responsibilities of some port districts include the literal management of marine ports and airports, others work mainly towards enticing job creation and developing infrastructure. Each port district is governed by a body of port commissioners.

Port commissioners are nominated by primary within their commissioner districts and elected at-large in the general election under mixed electoral systems (RCW 53.12.010). It is not clear why port district elections, along with those of county commissioners and public utility district commissioners, operate solely under mixed systems in contrast to most other types of local offices; I contacted the Washington State Legislature but was not provided with an answer.

I could find no legal avenues for instituting district-based or alternative elections of port district commissioners.

**County Commissioners**

County commissioners are the executives of Washington State’s counties. As such, they adopt the county budget, enact county ordinances, oversee zoning and planning policies, make appointments to numerous county committees, and oversee the administration of county government. Each county has three county commissioners.

County commissioners are nominated by the voters within their respective commissioner districts in a primary and must reside within their commissioner district. In the general election, county commissioners are elected at-large by the voters of the entire county (RCW 36.32.040).
I could find no legal avenues for instituting district-based or alternative elections of county commissioners.

**Public Utility District Commissioners**

Public utility districts provide services such as electricity, broadband internet, natural gas, and waste management to the residents within their boundaries. They are governed by an elected board of commissioners.

Public utility district commissioners are elected under mixed electoral systems. They are nominated by the voters within their respective commissioner districts in a primary and must reside within their commissioner district. In the general election, public utility district commissioners are elected at-large by the voters of the entire district (RCW 54.12.010).

I could find no legal avenues for instituting district-based or alternative elections of public utility district commissioners.

**Conservation District Supervisors**

Conservation districts encourage the stewardship of natural resources by providing educational and volunteer programs to residents as well as offering technical and financial assistance to landowners who are interested in conservation. They are governed by a board of supervisors elected at-large (RCW 89.08.190), with the top three candidates winning office.

At the request of conservation district supervisors, a conservation district can be divided into ‘zones’ which operate like residency districts. Conservation district supervisors must reside within their respective zone but are elected by the voters of the entire conservation district in the primary and general elections (RCW 89.08.190).

I could find no legal avenues for instituting mixed, district-based, or alternative elections of conservation district supervisors.

**Airport District Commissioners**

Airport districts oversee the operation and maintenance of airports within their boundaries. By default, the county commissioners of a county serve as the board for an airport district.

If 100 voters residing within an airport district file a petition requesting the formation of an elected board of airport commissioners, then commissioners are elected via an at-large system of primaries and general elections (RCW 14.08.302).

I could find no legal avenues for instituting mixed, district-based, or alternative elections of airport district commissioners.
In summary, it is clear from this analysis of public law that the statutory landscape of Washington State is very much tilted towards the use of at-large electoral systems in local elections. The picture is striking: only certain city councils are legally allowed to conduct district-based elections and it appears that no local offices are legally allowed to adopt the alternative electoral systems (limited voting, cumulative voting, and preference voting) which have been shown to produce relatively proportional minority representation (Brockington et al. 1998). Equally striking is the existence of a land-ownership requirement in order to vote in drainage, diking and flood control district elections. This requirement effectively excludes many Latino residents from voting because of their socioeconomic status. Under the current conditions, then, Latinos are unlikely to be able to make significant gains in their local political representation.

**GIS Analysis: A Look at the Sociodemographic Contributors to Latino Underrepresentation**

Having investigated the electoral systems and statutes of Washington State’s local jurisdictions, it is useful to ask how demographic characteristics might interact with these electoral rules to generate the startling underrepresentation uncovered in the ten counties examined. Steep disparities between the registration and election-day turnout levels of white and Latino voters in Washington State (NALEO 2006) indicate that the political problems for Latinos begin before they cast their ballots. The main contributors to these problems, as mentioned in the literature review, are sociodemographic factors: Latinos, who nationwide are disproportionately young, poor, unable to speak English well, foreign-born, non-citizens, and poorly educated (Garcia and Sanchez 2004; Jackson 2003) tend to be unfamiliar with voting or excluded from participation. Therefore the effects of any reforms to electoral systems in Washington State are likely to be reduced without accounting for the sociodemographic status of Latinos.

In order to address this problem, I conducted a GIS analysis in which I examined the boundaries of different local jurisdictions alongside the demographic factors identified in my literature review as being most influential to Latino political participation: age, income, ability to speak English and exposure to English speakers, level of education, nativity, and citizenship (Garcia and Sanchez 2004; Jackson 2003). Data from Douglas County, Franklin County, Skagit County, and Yakima County was included in the analysis.

GIS maps were produced for every office with available data within the four counties. These included city council districts, fire districts, county commissioner districts, school districts, hospital districts, water-sewer districts, conservation districts, public utility districts, park districts, cemetery districts, and port districts. Notable findings and maps used as case studies are produced in the main text of this report and the other maps are included in Appendix A.

**Fire Districts**
I examined GIS data for Franklin County’s fire districts. Map 1 shows the percent Hispanic population within Franklin County’s block groups overlaid on fire district boundaries.

Map 1
The brown areas in Map 1 indicate the most heavily concentrated Latino areas in Franklin County. Latinos in such areas are likely ‘geographically compact’ and especially able to benefit from single-member districting. Two areas are especially noticeable: the eastern half of Pasco’s fire district (labeled ‘PFD’) and the section in northern Franklin County in between Fire Districts 4 and 1.

Map 2
Map 2 shows the median age in each of Franklin County’s block groups. The population is especially young in the same areas with high percentage Latino populations.
Map 3 shows the median income in each of Franklin County’s block groups.
Map 4 shows the percent of Latino households which are ‘linguistically isolated’ in each block group. ‘Linguistic isolation’ exists in households with no adults who have the ability to communicate in English.
Map 5 displays the percentage of Franklin County residents who are foreign-born. While the definition of ‘foreign-born’ is broad enough that it includes non-Latinos, a comparison with Map 1 shows that the prominence of such communities in Franklin County is minimal and that most foreign-born residents are Latino.
Map 6 shows the proportion of foreign-born residents in Franklin County who lack citizenship.
Map 7 shows the percent of Latinos in Franklin County who have less than a 9th grade education. Taken together, these maps show that Latinos in the eastern part of Pasco’s fire district and the area of northern Franklin County divided between Fire Districts 4 and 1 have all the hallmarks of communities with depressed political participation (Garcia
and Sanchez 2004): they are disproportionately young, poor, linguistically isolated and unable to speak English well, foreign-born, non-citizens, and poorly educated. Residents in both areas would benefit if fire-districts could adopt single-member or alternative districts, which improve the chances for election of minority candidates (Leal et al. 2004; Brockington et al. 1998). However, I could not find any legal avenues to institute such elections in fire districts.

While Pasco Fire District, Fire District 4, and Fire District 1 cannot institute district-based elections, Latinos would likely benefit if the fire districts adopted the mixed systems allowed under law. As shown on Map 1, Latinos in Franklin County reside in high concentrations in geographically compact areas. With three commissioners elected in district-based primary elections, Latinos might constitute a majority of the voters in certain commissioner districts. Thus Latinos could elect their preferred candidates to the commissioner positions.

In Douglas County, Latinos residing within the boundaries of Fire District 15, Fire District 2, and Fire District 4 could benefit from the adoption of mixed electoral systems (Appendix A).

**Water-Sewer Districts**

Identical in governance to fire districts, water-sewer districts conduct their primary and general elections under at-large systems by default. Water-sewer districts may adopt mixed systems but have not done so in the ten counties examined.

I analyzed GIS data for Douglas County’s sewer district.

**Map 8**
The racial composition of Douglas County Sewer District is split between a mostly non-Latino north and a significant Latino minority in the southern half of the district. Latinos in the southern half constitute a geographically compact minority, but not at the levels seen in Franklin County where Latinos constituted up to 100% of the population of certain block groups.
Latino residents in the sewer district constitute a distinctly younger population than non-Latinos.
Latinos in Douglas County are also disproportionately poor.
The percent of Spanish households that are linguistically isolated in Douglas County Sewer District is significantly lower than those encountered in Franklin County’s fire and county commissioner districts. Even so, Latinos residing within the borders of the district suffer from a marked lack of English proficiency and these circumstances help to explain
their underrepresentation in local offices (Garcia and Sanchez 2004; Jackson 2003).

Map 12

A large percentage of Latinos in the district are foreign-born, although not to the degree seen in Franklin County’s fire districts.
Many Latinos are also non-citizens.
Finally, many Latinos in Douglas County Sewer District have attained less than a 9th grade education.
The demographic differences between the Latinos residing within the boundaries of Douglas County Sewer District and the Latinos residing in Franklin County suggest that Latinos in the Douglas County district are better integrated into the English-speaking society. Indeed, Latinos there are more likely to be from the United States, to be citizens, and to speak English. Some of the differences between the two Latino communities, like English proficiency, may in large part be attributable to the relatively diffuse concentration of Latinos in Douglas County Sewer District. Map 1 and Map 8 show that Latinos in Franklin County constitute nearly the entire population residing within certain block groups. Spanish-speakers in Franklin County probably encounter relatively little trouble going about their lives without English language skills in neighborhoods made up nearly entirely of other Spanish-speakers. Spanish-speakers in this area of Douglas County, on the other hand, are likely to find that task more difficult.

An equally reasonable explanation for these differences is that the characters of the Latino populations in Douglas County Sewer District and in Franklin County are fundamentally different. Maps 15, 16, and 17 show that there are areas within Douglas County (along the Columbia River near Sun Cove, seen here in Fire District 4) within which Latino communities are demographically similar to those in Franklin County.

Map 15
Map 16

Legend

Linguistic Isolation

Households: Spanish; Linguistically isolated / Households: Spanish

0.000000000 - 0.07843
0.07844 - 0.2432
0.2433 - 0.3750
0.3751 - 0.5313
0.5314 - 1.000
The demographic differences between the Latino communities of these two geographic regions in Douglas County necessitate that the electoral systems utilized in Douglas County Sewer District and Fire District 4 respond to the particular characteristics of each community. Water-sewer districts and fire districts both conduct their primary and
general elections under at-large systems by default; they may also both choose to adopt mixed electoral systems. The adoption of such a system, however, would likely have a greater impact in Fire District 4, where Latinos constitute the majority of the population in a geographically compact area (Vedlitz and Johnson 1982). Douglas County Sewer District might benefit more from the institution of an alternative voting system like cumulative voting, although public law currently restricts such a change. Alternative voting systems help to generate proportional minority representation even in districts where the minority population is not geographically compact (Brockington et al. 1998).

**County Commissioners**

In contrast to fire districts and water-sewer districts, Washington State’s county commissioner districts conduct their elections under mixed systems by default. However, there are no Latino county commissioners in the ten counties examined for this report, raising questions as to what other factors might be contributing to Latino political nonsuccess. GIS analysis of commissioner districts, then, provides an opportunity to diagnose previously unknown obstacles to the proportional representation of Latinos.

I examined GIS data for Franklin County’s county commissioner districts. Map 18 shows the percent Hispanic population within Franklin County’s block groups overlaid on county commissioner district boundaries.

**Map 18**
A close look at Map 18 reveals how significantly the drawing of commissioner districts can influence Latino representation. Commissioner District 1 is drawn to contain most of West Pasco, comprising a largely white population. But if the boundary lines of Commissioner District 1 had instead been drawn to encompass East Pasco, its population would have been overwhelmingly Latino.
Maps 19 through 24 show once again that the Latino population in Franklin County is disproportionately young, poor, predominantly Spanish-speaking, composed of immigrants and not well-educated.
Legend

- COMMISSIONER_DISTRICTS

Median Income

Households: Median household income in 1999

- $11861.000000 - 25742.000000$
- $25742.000001 - 35197.000000$
- $35197.000001 - 45461.000000$
- $45461.000001 - 59871.000000$
- $59871.000001 - 91038.000000$
Map 22

Legend
- COMMISSIONER_DISTRICTS

Foreign Born Population

Total population: Foreign born / Total population: Total
- 0.000000000 - 0.03479
- 0.03460 - 0.07133
- 0.07134 - 0.1242
- 0.1243 - 0.1914
- 0.1915 - 0.2823
- 0.2824 - 0.3768
- 0.3788 - 0.5014
As the GIS maps of Franklin County’s county commissioner districts show, the ability of Latinos to elect their preferred candidates can be affected not only by the type of electoral system and the demographic characteristics of Latinos but also the way in which the
jurisdiction’s boundaries are drawn. If Commissioner District 1 included East Pasco within its boundaries, then Latinos would constitute a geographic and potentially numerical majority in the district, greatly improving the electoral prospects of Latino candidates (especially if district-based rather than mixed elections were eventually adopted). The problem for Latinos, then, is not just changing the rules to allow for general elections by district (when primary elections by district are already happening), but also changing the boundaries of the districts that currently exist to reflect the geographical concentration of the Latino population.

Maps for Douglas County and Yakima County county commissioner districts were also produced and are collected in Appendix A.

City Councils

GIS data was available for the Pasco City Council. Previous research by Tim Shadix (2008) on the persistent nonsuccess of Latino candidates for council seats in Pasco determined that Latinos do not vote in council elections in numbers proportional to their population. In particular, Shadix determines that while non-Latinos turn out to vote at a rate of 45.8%, the Latino turnout rate is only 19.2%. GIS analysis of the Pasco City Council is therefore useful to reveal the specific factors which drive down the rate of Latino political participation.

Map 25
The Latino population in Pasco by and large resides within Council Districts 1, 2, and 3 in high concentrations. Council District 1 is predominantly Latino and Latinos constitute very significant minorities in Council Districts 2 and 3.
Residents residing within Pasco Council District 1 and 2 are disproportionately young. Residents in Council District 3 are on average older than the median age.
Residents residing within Council District 1, 2, and 3 have disproportionately low annual incomes.
Linguistically isolated Latino households are concentrated within the southern boundaries of Council Districts 1 and 2. Most Latino households in Council District 3 have adults with English proficiency.
Significant percentages of Latinos in all three council districts are foreign-born.
Map 30

Nearly all of the foreign-born Latinos in Council Districts 1, 2, and 3 are non-citizens.
Latinos residing within Council Districts 1, 2, and 3 are disproportionately not well-educated. The problem is worst in Council District 3, circumstances which are perhaps connected to the relative old age and non-native status of its residents as shown in Maps 26 and 29. While the young Latino populations of Council Districts 1 and 2 have likely
spent time enrolled in the American school system, there is no such likelihood for older immigrants.

The demographic characteristics of Latinos in the Pasco City Council districts help to shed light on Shadix’ research findings. In one instance, Shadix reports that a Latino candidate failed to win a 2001 city council election for City Council District 3 in part because of a pattern of racially polarized voting (Shadix 2008, 9). He also finds depressed Latino turnout in the city’s elections (Shadix 2008, 21). It is now clear that sociodemographic factors are contributing to this Latino nonsuccess: in City Council Districts 1 and 2, the youth, low incomes, linguistic isolation, non-nativity, lack of citizenship, and low levels of education of Latino residents; in City Council District 3, low incomes, non-nativity, lack of citizenship, and a severe lack of education. Even if Pasco were to adopt a cumulative election system, as Shadix suggests (Shadix 2008, 25), the effect of these sociodemographic factors on Latino turnout would need to be accounted for and addressed with increased outreach and support.

V. DISCUSSION

Before I began this research, too little was known about what the political conditions for Latinos were like for Latinos in Washington State. Reports put out by other researchers in past years (Shadix 2008, Dollar 2008, Warner 2006) found that Latinos were underrepresented on the city councils and school boards of several towns in Eastern Washington. My analysis confirms that their findings concerning underrepresentation exist on an even larger scale than previously considered. The pattern is statewide and no political offices are exceptions to the rule.

In addition, I have found that all of the sociodemographic factors identified by scholars to be the main contributors to low levels of political participation are present and widespread in Washington. Our local offices are restricted by state law to the use of electoral systems which are known to make it hard for minority groups to elect their preferred population. Put together, these factors create a political landscape in which it is nearly impossible for Latinos to elect their preferred candidates in local elections.

This situation demands change. Latinos are being systematically denied office without any fault of their own. In order to more fully diagnose the scope of this problem and prevent its future occurrence, I recommend that the Washington State Secretary of State’s Office begin maintaining a current and comprehensive list of local offices in Washington State, their incumbents, and the ways in which they conduct their elections. I also recommend that county auditors generate and make available GIS data for all of Washington State’s local offices.

In order to overcome the many obstacles to achieving proportional local political representation, Latinos must first organize themselves and seek support from their wider communities. These local-level associations will serve a dual purpose: first, to increase Latino political participation by partnering with concerned citizens and local leaders to conduct outreach to Latino voters; and second, to push county auditors and state
legislators to make much-needed changes to local electoral rules. Measures that address the sociodemographic character of Latinos are likely to most encourage their political participation. These may entail providing bilingual voting materials, as has been done in Adams, Franklin, and Yakima counties (Minor and Serrurier 2009); increasing the involvement of Latino youth in churches, school programs, and soccer leagues (Maffucci 2008); ensuring that Latino students have access to and are aware of higher education opportunities (Ruiz Soto 2009); and encouraging nonpartisan advocacy organizations to inform working-class Latinos about the importance of voting (Miller 2008). Such efforts should not be expected to immediately mobilize Latinos but to construct a political foundation upon which others can build.

Community members should also push for county auditors and elected officials to make use of all available institutional avenues to increase Latino representation. First, mixed electoral systems should be instituted as appropriate in those districts which can hold either mixed or at-large elections. Look, for instance, at Franklin County’s fire districts. Latinos within Pasco Fire District have all of the hallmarks of a minority group that cannot elect its preferred candidates due to turnout-lowering demographic factors of age, income, language, nativity, citizenship, and education. Yet there is a clear option in the fire district that improves their electoral prospects: division into commissioner districts.

For areas or in districts where this is not an option due to restrictive laws and statutes, I recommend that the Washington State Legislature amend the Revised Code of Washington to allow all local voting jurisdictions to change their voting method to a pure district-based or alternative system, either by referendum of the voters, discretion of the county auditor, or another suitable option. All types of municipalities and special purpose districts would be granted equal abilities to construct single-member or alternative election districts.

In particular need of reform are the local offices in Washington State which are currently locked into at-large systems. There are many of them: school districts, hospital districts, park and recreation districts, cemetery districts, special districts, conservation districts and airport districts. Given that the negative impact of at-large elections on minority representation has already been demonstrated several times in Washington State (Warner 2006; Dollar 2008), amendment of their statutes should be an immediate priority.

I do not mean to propose, however, that all municipalities and special purpose districts should or must change their voting systems. Some communities may prefer to elect their representatives at-large; such variations in our democratic system are to be expected and even celebrated. But when at-large or mixed systems interact with demographic factors to systematically deny elected office to minorities, district-based and alternative voting systems should be available for institution.

Most importantly, neither elected officials and the public at large nor Latinos should discount the importance of representation at the local-level. Many people view state and national elections as more important than local ones, and certain local elections as more important than others; this truism is reflected in the large body of research covering local-
level city council and school district elections and the extreme scarcity of research covering any others. Yet it is by gaining office to any and all of these local level offices that Latinos can begin to lay the foundation for a wholesale transformation of their communities.

In conclusion, this report should be examined as much for the answers it provides as for the questions that remain. Some arise from the limitations of my report: What might GIS analysis reveal about the six counties for which I could not obtain data? What is the level of Latino representation in the rest of Washington State’s counties? And what unique challenges face Latinos in counties where they do not constitute a large minority? Other research might look towards previously unexplored possibilities: Does the timing of Washington State’s local elections affect the electoral prospects of Latinos? What about the way in which ballots are constructed? Lastly, how might Latinos scale the political ladder beyond local-level elections in Washington State, and what obstacles are in their way? While this report provides a case study for documenting the political representation of Latinos in Washington State, such questions indicate that important work remains to be done.
Bibliography


APPENDIX A: GIS MAPS

DOUGLAS COUNTY

Cemetery Districts

Legend

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percent Hispanic Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HISPANIC / POP2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.004274 - 0.09115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.09116 - 0.2082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.2083 - 0.3919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.3920 - 0.6218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.6219 - 0.8942</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cemetery District #1
Cemetery District #2
Cemetery District #3
Legend

Lack of Citizenship
Total population: Foreign born; Not a citizen / Total population: Foreign born

- 0.000000000 - 0.137254902
- 0.137254903 - 0.370967742
- 0.370967743 - 0.531914894
- 0.531914895 - 0.671428571
- 0.671428572 - 0.785234900
- 0.785234900 - 0.889576063
- 0.889576063 - 1.000000000
Latino Educational Attainment: Less than 9th Grade

Legend:
- comis_dist

Latino Educational Attainment: Less than 9th Grade / Hispanic or Latino population 25 years and over: Total

- 0.000000000 - 0.1025
- 0.1027 - 0.3019
- 0.3020 - 0.4329
- 0.4330 - 0.5170
- 0.5171 - 0.6067
- 0.6088 - 0.7151
- 0.7152 - 1.000
Park and Recreation Districts

Legend

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parks Dist.</th>
<th>Percent Hispanic Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HISPANIC / POP2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.004274 - 0.09115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.00116 - 0.2082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.2083 - 0.3919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.3920 - 0.5210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.5219 - 0.6942</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Legend

Foreign Born Population

Total population: Foreign born / Total population: Total

- 0.0000000000 - 0.03479
- 0.03480 - 0.07133
- 0.07134 - 0.1242
- 0.1243 - 0.1914
- 0.1915 - 0.2823
- 0.2824 - 0.3768
- 0.3769 - 0.5014
Legend

- SCHOOL_DISTRICTS

Latino Educational Attainment: Less than 9th Grade
Sheet0$: Hispanic Less than 9th Grade / Hispanic or Latino population 25 years and over: Total

- 0.000000000 - 0.1026
- 0.1027 - 0.3019
- 0.3020 - 0.4329
- 0.4330 - 0.5170
- 0.5171 - 0.6087
- 0.6088 - 0.7151
- 0.7152 - 1.000
Legend

**Commissioner Districts**

**Percent Hispanic Population**

**HISPANIC / POP2000**

- 0.004274 - 0.00115
- 0.09166 - 0.2082
- 0.2003 - 0.3919
- 0.3920 - 0.6218
- 0.6219 - 0.8942

SKAGIT COUNTY

County Commissioners
Legend

Commissioner Districts

Foreign Born Population
Total population: Foreign born / Total population: Total
- 0.000000000 - 0.03479
- 0.03480 - 0.07133
- 0.07134 - 0.1242
- 0.1243 - 0.1914
- 0.1915 - 0.2623
- 0.2624 - 0.3768
- 0.3769 - 0.5014
Legend

Commissioner Districts

Latino Educational Attainment: Less than 9th Grade

Sheet05: Hispanic Less than 9th Grade / Hispanic or Latino population 25 years and over: Total

- 0.000 - 0.1026
- 0.1027 - 0.3019
- 0.3020 - 0.4329
- 0.4330 - 0.5170
- 0.5171 - 0.6087
- 0.6088 - 0.7151
- 0.7152 - 1.000
Legend

- School Districts

**Foreign Born Population**

Total population: Foreign born / Total population: Total

- 0.000000000 - 0.03479
- 0.03480 - 0.07133
- 0.07134 - 0.1242
- 0.1243 - 0.1914
- 0.1915 - 0.2823
- 0.2824 - 0.3768
- 0.3769 - 0.5014
Legend

- School Districts

Latino Educational Attainment: Less than 9th Grade
Sheet05: Hispanic Less than 9th Grade / Hispanic or Latino population 25 years and over: Total

- 0.000000000 - 0.1026
- 0.1027 - 0.3019
- 0.3020 - 0.4329
- 0.4330 - 0.5170
- 0.5171 - 0.6067
- 0.6088 - 0.7161
- 0.7162 - 1.000
YAKIMA COUNTY

County Commissioners